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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments."' In 1910,
the United States Supreme Court first recognized a proportionality
principle as implicit within the Eighth Amendment in Weems v.
United States.2 Under the proportionality principle, "the Eighth
Amendment bars not only punishments that are 'barabaric', but also
those that are 'excessive' in relation to the crime committed." 3 Since
Weems, the Court has continued to recognize an Eighth Amendment

1. U.S. Const. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,

nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted").
2. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The Court held that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause prohibited the sentence in Weems "both on account of [its] degree and kind."
Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
3. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).

1133
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proportionality principle. 4 In Harmelin v. Michigan,5 the United
States Supreme Court narrowed the Eighth Amendment's proportionality principle and held that only sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime committed violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.6
In Harmelin, the Court considered whether a sentence of life
7
imprisonment with no parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The primary question
addressed by the Court was whether the Eighth Amendment contains
a proportionality principle that prohibits sentences disproportionate
to the crime.8 Although differing opinions exist concerning the scope
of the principle, seven Supreme Court justices agree that the Eighth
Amendment does contain a proportionality principle. 9
The second issue decided by the Court-was whether a sentence
of life imprisonment with no parole requires an individualized sentencing scheme where the sentencer must consider factors in miti*gation and aggravation and then choose from a range of available
penalties. 10 A majority of the Court answered this question in the
negative" holding that the Constitution does not require individualized sentencing schemes outside the context of capital punishment.' 2 The Court noted that prior Supreme Court cases limited the
requirement for individualized sentencing schemes to sentences of
death. 3 The Court, therefore, refused to extend the individualized
4
sentencing doctrine to sentences not imposing capital punishment.'
4. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Rummel
v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Hutto v. Davis 454 U.S. 370 (1982); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277
(1983).
5. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
6. Id. at 2705 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
7. "This amount of pure cocaine has a potential yield of between 32,500 and 65,000 doses."
Id.
8. Id. at 2684 (plurality opinion).

9. Id. at 2702 (Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter, JJ., concurring); Id.at 2709, 2711 (White,
Blaikmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Id.at 2719 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10.
1.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

2684 (plurality opinion).
2701-02 (majority opinion).
2702.
2701-02.
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The Harmelin decision is complex and splintered: there are multiple issues, multiple theories for resolution of these issues, and multiple opinions. Despite the complexity, two general principles can
be distilled from the opinion: (1) the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution prohibits criminal sentences that are
grossly disproportionateto the crime committed, 5 and (2) a sentence
of life imprisonment with no parole does not require an individualized sentencing scheme where the sentencer must consider factors
in mitigation and aggravation and then choose from a range of
available penalties. 16
This Comment examines Harmelin v. Michigan and provides the
reader with an analysis of the Court's decision by considering the
history of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. A brief statement of the case and examination of the prior
law in the form of the United States Constitution and prior United
States Supreme Court cases precedes a discussion and analysis of
Justice Scalia's opinion, part of which is the majority opinion, Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion, and Justice White's dissenting opinion. Finally, the implications of the Harmelin decision are explored
leading to the conclusion that the Supreme Court, in Harmelin, has
narrowed the Eighth Amendment proportionality principle.
1I.

PRIOR LAw

As noted above, the United States Supreme Court considered
two issues in Harmelin v. Michigan. The Court first considered
whether Michigan's statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment with no parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment
7
because of the harshness of the sentence as compared to the crime.'
Examination of this issue requires a historical analysis of the Eighth
Amendment. As initially adopted, the Bill of Rights did not apply
to state governments; 8 it was a limitation on the power of only the

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 2705 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2701-02 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2684 (plurality opinion).
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1992

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 94, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 13
1136

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 94

federal government and did not apply to the states.1 9 However, in
Robinson v. California,20 the Supreme Court extended application

of the Eighth Amendment to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2' Thus, the federal Constitution now barred states from
imposing cruel and unusual punishments in their criminal justice
systems.
In 1892, the Supreme Court first discussed a proportionality principle between a sentence and a crime in Justice Field's dissent in
O'Neil v. Vermont. 22 Subsequently, in 1910, the Court adopted a
proportionality approach to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment in Weems v. United States.23 In Weems,
the defendant received a sentence of fifteen years of cadena temporal2 4
for falsifying official documents. His sentence included "hard and
painful labor" while chained at the wrists and ankles25 and a "per19. Id.
20. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
21. Id. at 666.
22. 144 U.S. 323 (1892). In his dissent, Justice Field argued that the Eighth Amendment ban
on cruel and unusual punishment was directed not only at tortuous punishments, but "against all
punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences
charged." Id. at 339-40. The Supreme Court had previously discussed the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment in two cases: In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 437 (1890) (death by
electrocution is not "inhumane and barbarous" and is therefore constitutional) and Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (death by firing squad is not cruel and unusual and is therefore constitutional).
23. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
24. The Philippine punishment of cadena temporal included the following provisions:
"They shall always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from the wrists; they shall be
employed at hard and painful labor, and shall receive no assistance whatsoever from without
the institution." There are besides certain accessory penalties imposed, which are defined
to be (1) civil interdiction; (2) perpetual absolute disqualification; (3) subjection to surveillance during life. These penalties are defined as follows: "Civil interdiction shall deprive
the person punished as long as he suffers it, of the rights of parental authority, guardianship
of person or property, participation in the family council, marital authority, the administration of property, and the rights to dispose of his own property by acts inter vivos.
Those cases are excepted in which the laws explicitly limits its effects. Subjection to the
surveillance of the authorities imposes the following obligations on the persons punished.
(1) That of fixing his domicil and giving notice thereof to the authority immediately in
charge of his surveillance, not being allowed to change it without the knowledge and permission of said authority in writing. . . ." The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
is the deprivation of office, even though it be held by popular election, the deprivation of
the right to vote or to be elected to public office, the disqualification to acquire honors,
etc., and the loss of retirement pay, etc.
Id. at 364-65 (1910) (citations omitted).
25. Id.
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petual limitation on his liberty.' '26 The Supreme Court reversed the
judgment and dismissed the punishments as repugnant to the' 28Eighth
Amendment 27 "both on account of their degree and kind.
In 1976, five Justices again agreed that excessive or disproportionately harsh sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment in Gregg v. Georgia.29 In Gregg,
a habeas corpus petitioner argued that the death penalty was cruel
and unusual punishment and therefore barred by the Eighth Amendment." The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the death
penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in all cases and
held that death is an appropriate penalty for certain crimes and
31
therefore is not cruel and unusual punishment in and of itself.
The following year, in Coker v. Georgia,32 the Court held the
death penalty disproportionate to the crime of rape and therefore
barred by the Eighth Amendment. 33 The Court stated that "the Eighth
Amendment bars not only those punishments that are 'barbaric' but
34
also those that are 'excessive' in relation to the crime committed.
Thus, the Court recognized the inherent nature of the proportionality principle in an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment analysis.
The Supreme Court next considered the proportionality principle
in 1980. In Rummel v. Estelle,35 the Court upheld a life imprisonment sentence with the possibility of parole, under a Texas re-

26. Id. at 366. See supra note 24.
27. Id. at 382.
28. Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
29. 428 U.S. 153, 171, 173, 187 (1976) (Powell, Stewart, and Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion);
Id. at 227-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Id. at 231-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 153 (plurality opinion).
31. Id. at 153-54.
32. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
33. Id. at 597.
34. Id. at 592. The Court further stated that:
a punishment is "excessive" and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution
to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity

of the crime.
35. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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cidivist statute, as not violating the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment." With two previous felony convictions, Rummel was convicted of obtaining $120 by false pretenses.37 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that
because the Court had applied the Eighth Amendment proportionality principle most often in death penalty cases, the doctrine had
limited application in non-capital cases.3 8 The Court did note that
the proportionality principle may apply in the non-capital context
in an extreme situation.3 9 Justice Powell dissented and argued that
the death penalty cases did not contain any language that would
limit the 70-year-old proportionality principle announced in Weems
v. United States o to cases involving capital punishment. 41
The Supreme Court upheld Rummel's narrow application of the
proportionality principle in Hutto v. Davis.42 Davis had been convicted of possession and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana
and sentenced to two consecutive twenty year prison terms and two
fines of $10,000.43 Davis claimed that his sentence was so grossly
out of proportion to the severity of his crimes that the sentence
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment barred by the Eighth
Amendment." The Supreme Court disagreed with Davis and affirmed his sentence in a per curiam decision. The Court reiterated
the Rummel proposition that "federal courts should be 'reluctan[t]
to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment' and that
'successful challenges to the proportionality of sentences' should be
'exceedingly rare."' 45
The Supreme Court last considered the Eighth Amendment's proportionality principle in Solem v. Helm.46 In Solem, the Court con36. Id. at 265.
37. Id. at 265-66.
38. Id. at 272.
39. Id. at 274 n.11 ("if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment").
40. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
41. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 292-93 (Powell, J., dissenting).
42. 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
43. Id. at 370-71.
44. Id. at 371.
45. Id. at 374 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 274 (1980)) (citations omitted)
(alteration in original).
46. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
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sidered whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited petitioner Helm's
sentence of life imprisonment with no parole for a seventh nonviolent felony conviction. 47 The Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to prohibit not only
barbaric punishments, but also disproportionate sentences.48 The
Court distinguished Rummel on the basis of Rummel's eligibility for
parole.4 9 Helm was not eligible for parole.50 To apply the rule, the
Court outlined three objective factors for comparison to the sentence
in question: (1) the gravity of the offense, (2) the sentences imposed
for other crimes in the same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. 51 Using these three
factors, the Court concluded that Helm's sentence was "significantly
disproportionate" to the crime and therefore prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment.5 2 Solem represented a firm extension of the propor53
tionality principle to sentences of imprisonment.
The second issue before the Court in Harmelin v. Michigan 4 was
whether a sentence of life imprisonment with no parole requires an
individualized sentencing scheme where the sentencer must consider
factors in mitigation and aggravation and then choose from a range
of available penalties.5 5 In 1976, the Supreme Court held in Woodson v. North Carolina56 that all cases involving the sentence of death
require individualized sentencing schemes. The Woodson plurality
said, "we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration
of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.' ' 7 Justice

47. Id. at 279.
48. Id. at 284.
49. Id. at 300-03.

50. Id. at 282.
51. Id. at 290-92.
52. Id. at 303.
53. Id. at 288-90; See also Jonathan C. Aked, Note, Solem v. Helm: The Supreme Court
Extends the ProportionalityRequirement to Sentences of Imprisonment, 1984 Wis. L. REy 1401, 1402.
54. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
55. Id. at 2684 (plurality opinion).

56. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
57. Id. at 304 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
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Brennan and Justice Marshall, who both believed the death penalty
always violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment,5 8 joined the plurality in reversing the petitioner's
death sentence.59 This alliance had the primary effect of establishing
that the Court would- sustain death sentences only if they resulted
from the use of individualized sentencing schemes at trial.
In Lockett v. Ohio,60 a seven member majority reversed a death
sentence. A four member plurality of the Court expressed the view
that the Ohio individualized sentencing scheme prescribed by statute
unconstitutionally restricted the range of mitigating factors the sentencer could consider. 6' The plurality concluded that "[t]he Ohio
death penalty statute does not permit the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors we now hold to be required by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases." 62 Justice Marshall concurred and expressed the view that the death penalty was
6
cruel and unusual punishment under all circumstances. 1
In Hitchcock v. Dugger,64 the Court unanimously reversed a death
sentence because the advisory jury and the sentencing judge did not
consider relevant evidence in mitigation. 65 The Court ruled that the
sentencing proceeding unconstitutionally violated the standards set
forth in Lockett v. Ohio66 for individualized sentencing schemes. 67
The Hitchcock Court stated that "in capital cases, 'the sentencer'
may not.

.

. 'be precluded from considering' any relevant mitigating

evidence.' '68
In summary, the Supreme Court firmly requires use of an individualized sentencing scheme, in which the sentencer must consider
factors in mitigation and aggravation and then choose from a range
58. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 306 (Marshall, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 306 (Marshall, J., concurring).
60. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
61. Id. at 608-09 (plurality opinion).
62. Id. at 606.
63. Id. at 619 (Marshall, J., concurring).
64. 481 U.S. 393 (1987).

65. Id. at 399.
66. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).

67. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 399 (1987).
68. Id. at 394 (quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986)).
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of available penalties, in all cases involving the penalty of death.
However, the Court has never required the use of individualized
sentencing schemes outside the context of capital punishment.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, Ronald Allen Harmelin, was convicted in a Michigan
bench trial of possessing 672 grams of cocaine in violation of Michigan law.69 Early one morning, two police officers stopped Harmelin's car in a high crime area for running a red light. 70 Harmelin
got out of his vehicle and informed the officers that he possessed
a licensed .38 caliber revolver. 71 After performing a pat-down search
of Harmelin for their own safety and discovering a quantity of marijuana, the officers placed Harmelin under arrest. 72 A subsequent
search of Harmelin's person revealed assorted pills and capsules,
three vials of white powder, ten baggies of white powder, drug paraphernalia, and a telephone beeper 3 A search of Harmelin's vehicle
uncovered a satchel containing $2,900 in cash and two bags of white
powder later determined to be 672 grams of cocaine. 74 Harmelin was
charged and convicted of possession of 672 grams of cocaine. 75 Under Michigan law, Harmelin received the statutory mandated term
of life imprisonment7 6 with no parole 7 . Harmelin appealed several
issues to the Michigan Court of Appeals: (1) ineffective assistance
of counsel, (2) unconstitutional seizure and pat-down of his person,
(3) unconstitutional search of his automobile, and (4) unconstitutional

69. People v. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d 75, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
70. Id at 77.
71. Id.

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 77-78.
75. Harmelin v. Michigan, I11 S. Ct. 2680, 2684 (1991) (plurality opinion). Note that Harmelin
was convicted of possession of 672 grams of cocaine and not possession of 672 grams of cocaine
with intent to distribute.
76. MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 333.7403(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 1990-91) provides for a mandatory

life imprisonment sentence for possession of 650 grams or more a schedule 2 controlled substance;
§ 333.7214(a)(iv) defines cocaine as a schedule 2 controlled substance.
77. MICH. Cop,. LAws ANN. § 791.234(4) (West 1990-91) provides eligibility for parole after
ten years in prison, except for those convicted of either first-degree murder or a "major controlled
substance offense"; § 791.233b[l](b) defines "major controlled substance offense" as, among other
things, a violation of § 333.7403(2)(a)(i) (see supra note 76).
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sentencing: his statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment
with no parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.78 The
Michigan Court of Appeals initially reversed Harmelin's conviction
on state constitutional grounds. 79 However, the court reconsidered
and reversed its holding on the state constitutional issue and affirmed Harmelin's conviction and mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with no parole.80 The Michigan Supreme Court denied
Harmelin's appeal.8 '
Finally, Harmelin petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari. Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court limited the case to two issues. 2 First, the Court considered whether
Harmelin's sentence of life imprisonment with no parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine violates the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment." Second, the Court
examined whether a sentence of life imprisonment with no parole
requires an individualized sentencing scheme that requires the sentencer to consider factors in mitigation and aggravation and then
4
choose from a range of available penalties.
IV.

CASE ANALYSIS

The United States Supreme Court affirmed Harmelin's sentence
of life imprisonment with no parole. 5 Justice Scalia announced the
78. People v. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
79. Id. at 78. The Michigan Court of Appeals initially held that the search which uncovered
the cocaine was conducted in violation of the search and seizure provision of the Michigan Constitution
which provides:
The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or
things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to bar from evidence
in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized by a police officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in
this state.
MICH. CoNsT. art. 1, § 11.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 76.
434 Mich. 863 (1990).
Harmelin v.Michigan, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2684 (1991) (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id. at 2702.
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judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Chief
86
Justice Rehnquist joined and three other Justices joined in part.
As noted above, the Supreme Court considered two issues in Harmelin. First, the Court considered whether a sentence of life imprisonment with no parole for the crime of possession of 672 grams
of cocaine constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment.87 Second, the Court examined whether a
sentence of life imprisonment with no parole requires an individualized sentencing scheme where the sentencer must consider factors
in mitigation and aggravation and then choose from a range of
available penalties.88
As to the first issue, Justice Scalia rejected Harmelin's Eighth
Amendment constitutional challenge to his sentence of life imprisonment with no parole.8 9 Justice Scalia, joined only by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, argued that, outside the context of capital punishment,
the Eighth Amendment contains absolutely no proportionality principle. 90
The other seven Justices rejected Justice Scalia's interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
They interpreted the Eighth Amendment to contain a general proportionality principle. However, these seven Justices disagreed on
the proper standard to determine if a sentence violated this proportionality principle. Three of the seven Justices supported a twostep test: 9' (1) an initial determination of whether the sentence under
question was "grossly disproportionate" to the crime committed, 92
and if so, (2) an application of the intra- and inter-jurisdictional
analyses described in Solem. 93 The other four Justices argued for a
86. Justice Scalia announced the decision of the Court and delivered the lead opinion joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 2684 (plurality opinion). In Part V of his opinion, Justice Scalia
wrote for a majority of the Court as he was also joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and
Justice Souter. Id. at 2701-02 (majority opinion). Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion joined
by Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter. Id. at 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 2684 (plurality opinion).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2684-2701.
90. Id. at 2686, 2701.
91. Id. at 2702-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 2707.
93. See supra text accompanying note 51 for the three Solem factors.
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plain application of the three factor test described in Solem.94
As to the second issue decided by the Court, Justice Scalia, writing for a majority of the Court in Part V of his lead opinion, 95
rejected Harmelin's invitation to extend the requirement for individualized sentencing schemes outside the context of capital punishment. 96 The Court affirmed Harmelin's sentence of life
imprisonment with no parole.97

A.

Justice Scalia's Opinion

1. Opinion
As to the first and primary issue of whether the Eighth Amendment requires Harmelin's sentence to be proportional to his crime,
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that outside
the capital context, the Eighth Amendment does not require a sentence to be proportional to the crime. 98 Justice Scalia begins his
analysis of the Eighth Amendment with a review of Rummel v.
Estelle,99 where the Court stated that "one could argue without fear
of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable
by significant terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the
length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative."' 10 Justice Scalia noted that in Rummel, the
Court specifically rejected the three objective factors proposed by
the dissent' 01 to determine whether a sentence violates the Eighth
Amendment.10 2 However, Justice Scalia acknowledges that under
94. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2709-19 (1991) (White, Blackmun, and Stevens,
JJ., dissenting); Id. at 2719 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note 51 for a

description of the Solem three-factor test.
95. Harmelin, IIl S. Ct. at 2701-02 (majority opinion).

96. Id.
97.
98.
99.
100.
opinion).
101.

Id. at 2702.
Id. at 2686, 2701 (plurality opinion).
445 U.S. 263 (1980).
Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2684 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980)) (plurality
These three objective factors proposed by the dissent in Rummel are the same three factors

adopted in Solem. See supra text accompanying note 51 for a description of the three Solem factors.
102. Harmelin, 111 S.Ct. at 2684 (plurality opinion).
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Rummel, a proportionality analysis would be appropriate in extreme
examples. 103
Next, Justice Scalia points out that in Hutto v. Davis, 1 4 the
Court again rejected application of the three factors proposed by
the Rummel dissent. 05 Justice Scalia said that although the Davis
opinion invited the inference that "gross disproportionality" was
one of the exceedingly rare situations where an Eighth Amendment
proportionality challenge should be successful, such an inference is
incompatible with the Court's sharp reversal of the finding that "40
years for possession of marijuana was grossly disproportionate and
'0 6
therefore unconstitutional.'
Justice Scalia then moves to Solem v. Helm,'0 7 the most recent
decision by the Supreme Court on this subject prior to Harmelin.08
Solem held that the Eighth Amendment embodies a general principle
of proportionality and adopted the three-factor test rejected in Rummell and Davis.09 Justice Scalia argues that, based on a historical
analysis of the Eighth Amendment, Solem was simply wrong" and
should be overruled."'
In support, Justice Scalia argues that Solem assumed, with no
supporting analysis, that cruel and unusual were simply synonyms
for the same concept. 1 2 Justice Scalia then departs into an extended
analysis of the history of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
to examine both the historical roots of the clause and the understanding of the clause when it was adopted as an amendment to
our Constitution."' Justice Scalia traces the history of the propor-

103. "This is not to say that a proportionality principle would not come into play in the extreme
example mentioned by the dissent, . . . if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable
by life imprisonment" Id. (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.ll (1980)).
104. 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
105. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2685 (plurality opinion).
106. Id. at 2685.
107. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
108. Harmelin, I11 S. Ct. at 2685 (plurality opinion).
109. Id. at 2686.
110. Id.
1i1.Id. at 2696.
112. Id. at 2686.
113. Id. at 2686-99.
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tionality doctrine and the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments"
from the Magna Carta through the English Declaration of Rights
of 1689"i a to the adoption of our Bill of Rights." 5 He concludes
that it is "most unlikely" that the English Declaration of Rights of
1689 contained a proportionality guarantee."1 6 Furthermore, Justice
Scalia adds that the English interpretation of the phrase "cruel and
unusual punishments" is irrelevant since at the time of the adoption
of the Bill of Rights, there was no federal common-law tradition
in America upon which to base a determination of what was cruel
and unusual punishment because of the infancy of the republic.",
Another point made by Justice Scalia is that if the Eighth Amendment did contain a proportionality guarantee, the Americans who
drafted the Eighth Amendment would have stated it directly and
not in "an exceedingly vague and oblique way.""'
Next, Justice Scalia argues that the contemporary understanding
of the Eighth Amendment at the time of its adoption indicates that
it contained no proportionality guarantee." 9 He cites the actions of
the First Congress to support this contention. 12 0 The First Congress
"punished forgery of United States securities, 'run[ning] away with
[a] ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty
dollars,' treason, and murder on the high seas with the same penalty:
death by hanging.'121 The contemporary writings, Justice Scalia contends, do not contain any reference to a proportionality principle.122
Justice Scalia then reviews various state interpretations of the
federal and state cruel and unusual punishments constitutional
clauses. He highlights the fact that many state constitutions ratified
after the federal constitution are worded differently from the federal

114. The English Declaration of Rights of 1689 is the antecedent of the text of our Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 2686.
115. Id. at 2686-94.
116. Id. at 2691.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2692.
119. Id. at 2693.
120. Id. at 2694.
121. Id. (quoting 1 Stat. 114) (alteration in original).
122. Id.
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constitution in that they prohibit "cruel or unusual" punishment. 23
Also, Justice Scalia notes that many state constitutions contain proportionality guarantees in addition to cruel and unusual punishments
clauses.1 24 He contends that these state constitutional provisions and
the decisions interpreting them support his conclusion that the Eighth
25
Amendment prohibits only certain modes of punishment.
Justice Scalia examines the three factors Solem held relevant to
a determination of the proportionality of a sentence. 126 As to the
first factor, the gravity of the offense, Justice Scalia points to the
difficulty in drawing a line that indicates when a sentence is disproportionate in relation to a certain crime and concludes that this
factor fails the test of objectivity. 27 He argues that "no textual or
historical standards" exist for determining if a sentence is excessive
in relation to a crime. 28 Justice Scalia then argues that the second
factor, "the sentences imposed for similarly grave offenses in the
same jurisdiction,"' 29 fails for the same reason as the first the factor 30
- there are no objective standards for determining what offenses
are similarly grave. Justice Scalia argues that the third factor, "sentences imposed for the same crime in the other jurisdictions,"'' "has
no conceivable relevance to the Eighth Amendment.' 32 He argues
that the very reason for our federal system of government is diversity
among jurisdictions.13 He points out that this diversity allows each
state to respond to the different situations, needs, and concerns of
its citizens. 1 Justice Scalia contends that simply because the State
of West Virginia chooses to penalize possession of 672 grams of
cocaine as a minor offense (misdemeanor with a penalty of 90 days

123. Id. at 2695.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2696.

126.
factors.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 2697. See supra text accompanying note 51 for a description of the three Solem
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2698 (1991) (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id.at 2697.
Id.at 2698.
Id.at 2697.
Id.at 2698.
Id.at 2699.
Id.
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to 6 months imprisonment), t35 "nothing in the Constitution requires
Michigan to follow suit.''136
Finally, Justice Scalia concedes that the Supreme Court has recognized a limited proportionality guarantee within the Eighth
Amendment. 3 7 But, he contends that this guarantee is properly limited to cases of capital punishment because of the unique and final
nature of death.'
As to the second issue, Justice Scalia, speaking for the majority,
announced that the Court refused to extend the requirement for
individualized sentencing schemes outside the context of capital punishment.1 39 Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court has exclusively
limited the requirement for individualized sentencing schemes to sentences of death.1t The Court noted the "qualitative difference between death and all other penalties"' t4' and the fact that not all of
Harmelin's opportunities for reducing his sentence are foreclosed. 142
Harmelin retains the possibility of a reduced sentence in the form
43
of retroactive legislation or executive clemency.'
2.

Analysis

Justice Scalia's contention that the cruel and unusual punishments clause in the English Declaration of Rights of 1689 did not
contain a proportionality principle is contrary to the weight of authority in interpreting English law. In developing his argument,
Justice Scalia cites the work of Anthony F. Granucci t44 often 4 but
reaches a conclusion contrary to Granucci's conclusion that the Eng-

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

W. VA. CODE § 60A-4-401(c) (1989).
Harmelin v. Michigan, II1 S. Ct. 2680, 2699 (1991) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2699.
Id. at 2701.
Id. at 2701-02.
Id. at 2702.
Id. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Harmelin v. Michigan, III S. Ct. 2680, 2702 (1991) (plurality opinion).

143. Id.

144. Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and UnusualPunishmentsInflicted:" The OriginalMeaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839 (1969).

145. Five times in six pages. See Harmelin v. Michigan, II1 S.Ct. 2680, 2688-93 (1991) (plurality
opinion).
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lish Declaration of Rights did contain a proportionality principle. 146
Granucci's work is recognized as "It]he seminal work on the history
of the Eighth Amendment."1 47
Next, Justice Scalia argues that even if the English interpretation
of their cruel and unusual punishments clause did embody a proportionality guarantee, such an interpretation of the American clause
would have been impossible because there were no federal commonlaw punishments available upon which to make a comparative determination of what sentences were cruel and unusual. But, as pointed
out by Justice White in his dissent, the new Americans had lived
under the criminal laws of the states for years and therefore would
not have lacked standards for determining what punishments were
cruel and unusual. 148 Justice Scalia argues that the proportionality
principle offers no textual or historical standards for determining
what is cruel and unusual punishment. 149 However, this is precisely
the type of line drawing the courts regularly perform. 50
Justice Scalia says that if the Eighth Amendment as adopted did
contain a proportionality principle, the plain-talking Americans who
drafted it would have stated it directly. Justice White sarcastically
notes that those same Americans drafted the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause and the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures' which can hardly be considered
plain language descriptions of the legal concepts and individual liberties they embody.
Justice Scalia concedes that the language of the Eighth Amendment allows for a construction that embodies a proportionality principle. 5 2 His reasons against such a construction today do not
overcome eighty years of Supreme Court jurisprudence that has embraced the concept of a general proportionality principle within the
Eighth Amendment. Justice Scalia's conclusion that the Eighth
146. Granucci, supra note 144, at 860.
147. Aked, supra note 53, at 1403 n.10.
148. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2710 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).

149. Id. at 2698 (plurality opinion).
150. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294 (1983); Aked, supra note 53, at 1415.
151. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2710 (1991).
152. Id. at 2692.
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Amendment does not contain a general proportionality principle is
contrary to every twentieth century Supreme Court case on the subject. 153 Justice Scalia even acknowledges that these cases make allowance for an Eighth Amendment proportionality principle.
Rummel, which Justice Scalia relied upon heavily, concedes that
outside the capital context, challenges to the proportionality of excessive sentences are sometimes appropriate, although rare. 54 Solem
reiterated "[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will be]
exceedingly rare. ' 155 Davis said the same thing. 56 When put to the
test, seven Supreme Court Justices rejected Justice Scalia's argument
that the Eighth Amendment does not contain a general proportionality principle.
B.

Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
1.

Opinion

Justice Kennedy concurred with Part V of Justice Scalia's
opinion 57 that announced the Court's decision on the case and the
holding on the second issue decided by the Court: a life imprisonment sentence with no parole does not require an individualized
sentencing scheme. 8 However, Justice Kennedy wrote a separate
opinion, joined by Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter, because he
disagreed with Justice Scalia's contention that the Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportionality principle outside context
of capital punishment. Justice Kennedy believes that the Eighth
Amendment does contain a proportionality principle.' 59 Convincingly, Justice Kennedy noted that regardless of the historical arguments concerning the Eighth Amendment in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, eighty years of Supreme Court case law rec-

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See supra part II.
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983) (alterations in original).
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982).
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2702 (Kennedy J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
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ognize an Eighth Amendment proportionality principle and stare
decisis "counsels" adherence to that principal.' 6
Justice Kennedy surveys the prior Supreme Court cases concerning cruel and unusual punishments and concludes: "Our decisions recognize that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
encompasses a narrow proportionality principle." 61 However, Justice
Kennedy points out that the precise contours of the proportionality
principle remain unclear. 62 To define these contours, Justice Kennedy analyzes these prior cases to discover "some common principles
63
that give content to the uses and limits of proportionality review."
Justice Kennedy reports that four common principles run through
the thread of the Supreme Court's prior cases concerning cruel and
unusual punishments. The first principle is that the determination
of the length of prison terms is generally an issue for the legislature: 6
Determinations about the nature and purposes of punishment for criminal acts
implicate difficult and enduring questions respecting the sanctity of the individual,
the nature of law, and the relation between law and social order .... The efficacy
of any sentencing system cannot be assessed absent agreement on the purposes

and objectives of the penal system. And the responsibility for making these fun5
damental choices and implementing them lies with the legislature.6

Therefore, "[r]eviewing courts ... should grant substantial defer-

ence to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in
determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes.' ' 66
The second principle common to the cruel and unusual punishment cases is that the Eighth Amendment does not adopt any one
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.at 2703.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2703-04 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 290); See also Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 (acknowledging "reluctance to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment"); Weems, 217 U.S.
at 379 ("The function of the legislature is primary, its exercises fortified by presumptions of right
and legality, and is not to be interfered with lightly, nor by any judicial conception of their wisdom
or propriety").
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particular penological theory. 167 Both the state and federal justice
systems have given the different goals of "retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation" varied priorities at different
68
times.1
The third principle noted by Justice Kennedy is that under our
federal system of government, significant differences in sentencing
theories and terms are inevitable and often beneficial. 69 "Our federal system recognizes the independent power of a State to articulate
societal norms through criminal law."'' 70 This situation makes interstate comparison of sentences difficult.' 7' Also, differing penological attitudes and differing local conditions may justify different,
yet rational, prison terms for the same crime. 72 The fact that one
state has the most severe penalty for a certain crime does not, by
7
itself, render that penalty unconstitutional. 1
The final principle common to the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment cases is that the proportionality analysis should be guided
by "'objective factors to the maximum possible extent.""1'
Justice
Kennedy notes that the Court has easily drawn an objective line
between capital punishment and imprisonment, but the Court "lack[s]
clear objective standards to distinguish between sentences for different terms of years. '1 75 Because of this lack of objectivity concerning prison sentences, "'[o]utside the context of capital
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular
' 76
sentences [are] exceedingly rare.""1
Upon consideration of these common principles, 7 7 Justice Kennedy synthesizes the principle that "the Eighth Amendment does
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2704 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting McClesky v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1469 (1991)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980) (quoting Coker v. Georgia,

433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion))); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).
175. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2704-05 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 2705 (alteration in original) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983)
(quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980))).

177. "[T]he primacy of the legislature, the variety of legitimate penological schemes, the nature
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not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather,
it forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate'
78
to the crime.'
Without commenting on the wisdom of the Michigan sentencing

scheme, Justice Kennedy concludes that "the Michigan Legislature
could with reason conclude that the threat posed to the individual

and society by possession of this large an amount of cocaine 179 in terms of violence, crime, and social displacement - is momentous

enough to warrant the deterrence and retribution of a life sentence

without parole."' 80 Justice Kennedy reasons that the comparative
analyses prescribed in Solem 8' are therefore not necessary in this
case. In support, he notes the primacy of the legislature 82 and the
183
fact that Solem did not mandate such analyses:

A better reading of our cases leads to the conclusion that intra- and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold
comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference
of gross disproportionality....

The proper role for comparative analysis of sentences, then, is to validate
an initial judgment that a sentence is grossly disproportionate to a crime.-'

Thus, Justice Kennedy argues that the proper standard for de-

termining whether Harmelin's sentence is cruel and unusual involves
a two-step test:

85

(1) an initial determination of whether the sentence

of our federal system, and the requirement that proportionality review be guided by objective factors."
Id.
178. Id. (emphasis added). See also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (the Eighth Amendment prohibits "significantly disproportionate" sentences); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)
(the Eighth Amendment prohibits "grossly disproportionate" sentences).
179. Six hundred seventy-two grams of pure cocaine will yield between 32,500 and 65,000 doses.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2705 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 2706.
181. The second and third Solem comparative factors are: a comparison of the sentence in
question with (2) penalties imposed in the same jurisdiction for other crimes and (3) penalties imposed
in other jurisdictions for the same crime. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291-92 (1983).
182. See supra text accompanying note 166.
183. The Solem Court stated that "it may be helpful to compare sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction," and "courts may find it useful to compare the sentences imposed
for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Solem, 463 U.S. at 291-92 (emphasis added).
184. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 1680, 2707 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
185. Id. at 2702-07.
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in question is grossly disproportionateto the crime committed, 8 6
and if so, (2) an application of the second and third Solem intraand inter-jurisdictional comparative factors. 8 7 Harmelin argued that
his crime was nonviolent and victimless. Justice Kennedy dismissed
this claim as "false to the point of absurdity."' 8 Justice Kennedy
summarized multiple studies that demonstrate a strong positive correlation between illegal drugs and crime.' 89 On comparing Harmelin's
sentence with the crime committed, Justice Kennedy saw no inference of gross disproportionality, and concluded that the sentence is
therefore constitutional and the Solem intra- and inter-jurisdictional
comparative analyses were not necessary here. 90
Justice Kennedy finishes his opinion with a reiteration of his
support for the Opinion of the Court on the second issue: imposition
of a life sentence with no parole does not require an individualized
sentencing scheme. 91 He points out that the Supreme Court cases
detailing requirements for individualized sentencing schemes have
been exclusively limited to cases involving capital punishment. 92
Justice Kennedy noted that "[s]ince the beginning of the Republic,
Congress and the States have enacted mandatory sentencing
schemes,"' 193 and that "[ilt is beyond question that the legislature
'has the power to define criminal punishments without giving the
courts any sentencing discretion.""'1 94 Justice Kennedy concludes that
the severity and mandatory nature of Harmelin's sentence of life
imprisonment with no parole is entirely within the bounds of state
power to deal with serious societal problems. 95
2. Analysis
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion integrates the entire range
of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue of cruel and unusual
186. Id. at 2707.

187. Id. See supra text accompanying note 51 for the Solem factors.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Harmelin, I11 S. Ct. at 2706 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy focused on the link between cocaine and violent crime. Id.
Id. at 2707.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2708.
Id. (quoting Chapman v. United States, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1929 (1991)).

195. Id. at 2709.
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punishment and synthesizes a principle common to all of these cases.
Justice Kennedy's analysis of the case law yields the conclusion that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits only sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. 96
Relying on the extremely negative impact illegal drugs have on
modern society, Justice Kennedy reasoned that Harmelin's sentence
does not give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality.197 This
conclusion is supported by numerous studies that reflect the deleterious effects of illegal drug abuse. 98 Our federal government has
declared the war on drugs to be one of the nation's highest priorities. 99 In this war, the possession of 672 grams of cocaine with
a yield of 32,500 to 65,000 street doses would seem to deserve a
particularly harsh penalty. The Michigan Legislature, in adopting
the penalty of the imprisonment with no parole for someone convicted of possessing 650 grams or more of cocaine, obviously made
the inference that such a large amount of cocaine was intended not
for personal use, but for distribution.
Justice Kennedy correctly characterized Harmelin's claim that his
crime was victimless as "false to the point of absurdity." 2 ° ° The
effects of the illegal drug trade are extensively documented:
The new terror on America's streets is inseparable from the explosion of the
drug trade ....
The 1980s have the seen the resurgence of street gangs, many of which profit

196. Id. at 2705.
197. Id.at 2707.
198. 50% inStudy Admit Violent Acts During Usage of Crack Cocaine, L.A. TimEs, Mar. 24,
1989, § 1 at 16; Randy Hanzlick & Gerald T. Gowitt, Cocaine Metabolite Detection its Homicide
Victims, 265 JAMA 760 (1991); Margaret C. Heagarty, Crack Cocaine; A New Dangerfor Children,
144 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 756 (1990); Robert E. Fullilove et al., Risk of Sexually Transmitted

Disease Among Black Adolescent Crack Users in Oakland and San Francisco, Calif., 263 JAMA 851
(1990); Eugene E. Herbert III & Joyce A. O'Neil, Drug Use Forecasting: An Insight into Arrestee
Drug Use, NAT'L INST. JusT. REP., June 1991, at 11, 12.

199. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-189,
103 Stat. 1660. See also Proclamation No. 6210, 3 C.F.R. 228 (1991); S. Res. 346, 101st Cong. 2d
Sess. (1990); Proclamation No. 6166, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1991); Proclamation No. 6081, 3 C.F.R 193
(1990); Proclamation No. 5883, 3 C.F.R 146 (1989).
200. Harmelin v. Michigan, I11 S.Ct. 2680, 2706 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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from narcotics and enforce their own ruthless brand of law with drive-by shootings
and turf wars that leave the real lawmen ducking for cover. 0'

"During every 100 hours on our streets we lose three times more
men than were killed in 100 hours of ground war in the Persian
Gulf.' '202
The damaging effects of the cocaine trade are not limited to
America's borders. The murder rate in Columbia is the highest of
any nation not involved in a civil war with more than 20,000 murders
in 1988 in a country of 25 million. 203 More than 220 Columbian
judges have been killed in the last ten years and more than 1,600
were threatened. 204
Justice White complains that Justice Kennedy's two-step test
"eviscerates" Solem by failing to apply all three objective factors.
Justice Kennedy points out that Justice White's strict adherence to
the Solem three-factor test ignores the Rumme 205 and Davis2 6 decisions where the Court upheld sentences against proportionality attacks without performing such comparative analyses. Justice
Kennedy's two-step test integrates all three recent decisions into a
practical standard that can be readily applied by the lower courts.
C. Justice White's Dissenting Opinion
1. Opinion
Justice White 207 believed that the Eighth Amendment embodies
a "proportionality component. ' 20 8 He argued that all three of the
factors enumerated in Solem should be applied to Harmelin's sen201. Gordon Witkin et al., Cops Under Fire, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 3, 1990, at 32.
202. He Said She Said They Said We Said (quoting Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Secretary of Health
and Human Services), LnE, Jan. 1992, at 100.
203. Columbia Cocaine War: In for the Long Haul and More Blood, UPI, Sept. 3, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file.
204. Id.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41 for a discussion of Rummel.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45 for a discussion of Davis.
207. Joined by Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680,
2709 (1991) (White, J, dissenting). Justice Marshall agreed with Justice White's dissenting opinion,
except that he believed the Eighth Amendment also prohibits the death penalty. Id. at 2719 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 2711 (White, J., dissenting).
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tence and that, as a consequence, Harmelin's sentence violated the
20 9
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments.
Justice White begins with a critical analysis of Justice Scalia's
opinion. Justice White highlights Justice Scalia concession that the
language of the Eighth Amendment bears the construction of a general proportionality principle. 210 Justice White then noted that Justice
Scalia's contention that the English Declaration of Rights of 1689
does not contain a proportionality component lacks strong support
and that other scholars disagree with Justice Scalia on this point.
Also, no matter what the intention of the constitutional framers was,
for over eighty years the Supreme Court has recognized a proportionality principle embodied within the Eighth Amendment.2 2 During this time, "none of the Court's cases suggest that such a
'
construction is impermissible. 213
Justice Scalia boldly states "the Eighth Amendment contains no
proportionality guarantee." 21 4 However, he later moves to what
Justice White calls Justice Scalia's fallback position: proportionality
review is not required by the Eighth Amendment, except in cases
of capital punishment. 215 Justice White laments Justice Scalia's failure to explain why the Eighth Amendment includes a proportionality
review in some cases but not in others. Justice Scalia suggests that
the qualitative difference between death and all other punishments
is a sound basis for this distinction,2 16 but Justice White points out
that the Court's capital punishment proportionality cases totally reject Justice Scalia's contention that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
only certain modes or methods of punishment.2 7 Justice White noted
that if Justice Scalia was correct, "capital punishment - a mode
of punishment - would either be completely barred or left to the
discretion of the legislature. Yet neither is true. The death penalty
209. Id. at
210. Id.at
211. Id.at
212. Id.at
213. Id.at
214. Id.at
215. Id.at
216. Id.at
217. Id.at

2716.
2710.
2710 & n.l.
2710-11.
2711.
2686 (plurality opinion).
2712 (White, J., dissenting).
2701 (plurality opinion).
2712 (White, J., dissenting).
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is appropriate in some cases and not in others. The same should be
'21t
true of punishment by imprisonment.
Next, Justice White criticizes Justice Kennedy's reading of Solem.
Justice White argued that Solem insisted that all three factors be
applied in the proportionality analysis. Justice White quoted from
' 21 9
Solem that "no one factor will be dispositive in a given case,
and "no single criterion can identify when a sentence is so grossly
disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment.''220 Justice

White asserts that Justice Kennedy's omission of the second and
third Solem factors makes the proportionality analysis an exercise
in judicial subjectivity, 22t "which is the very sort of analysis our
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has shunned." 222
Because Justice White saw no justification for overruling or limiting Solem, he proceeds to apply the three Solem factors to Harmelin's sentence. The first factor requires a comparison of the gravity
of the offense and the harshness of the penalty.223 Justice White
concludes that "[t]he 'absolute magnitude' of petitioner's crime is
not exceptionally serious.'' 24 Justice White concedes that drug abuse
is a serious societal problem, but believes that possession of a large
quantity of drugs, as here, will not always warrant life imprisonment
with no parole. Justice White complains that, in justifying Harmelin's sentence, Justice Kennedy focused on the subsidiary or indirect effects of illegal drug use. Justice White asserts that the indirect
consequences of cocaine abuse can be equated to the consequences
that flow from misuse of legal substances, such as alcohol, which
lessens the seriousness of the crime. Finally, Justice White argues
that, in effect, Harmelin was convicted of the greater crime of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute without proof of Harmelin's intent to distribute, because, under Michigan law, the

218.
219.
v. Helm,
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2714 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Solem
463 U.S. 277, 291 n.17 (1983)).
Id.
Id. at 2715.
Id.
Id. at 2716; Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1983).
Harmelin v. Michigan, IlI S. Ct. 2680, 2717 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
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penalties for (1) possession of 672 grams of cocaine and (2) possession of 672 grams of cocaine with intent to distribute are the
same.

225

The second Solem factor involves a comparison of Harmelin's
sentence to the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction. 226 Imposition of the same or a lesser sentence for a more
serious crime may render a punishment excessive. 227 Since Harmelin's
sentence was mandatory and the harshest available in Michigan 228
while crimes such as second-degree murder, rape, and armed robbery
allow for judicial discretion, Justice White declared that Harmelin
"has been treated in the same manner as, or more severely than,
criminals who have committed far more serious crimes." 229
The third and final Solem factor examines the sentences imposed
for the same crime in other jurisdictions. 0 Justice White notes that
Michigan's sentence for Harmelin's crime is, by far, the most severe
in the country. 231 For example, in Alabama, the only other state that
imposes a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with no parole
for first time drug offenders, 23 2 Harmelin would be subject to a
mandatory minimum sentence of five years in prison. 233 Also, Justice
White highlighted that under the federal sentencing guidelines, Harmelin's sentence would be approximately ten years.234 Justice White
concludes that "the fact that no other jurisdiction provides such a
severe, mandatory penalty for possession of this quantity of drugs
is enough to establish 'the degree of national consensus this Court
has previously thought sufficient to label a particular punishment

225. Life imprisonment with no parole. Id.
226. Id. at 2718; Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983).
227. Solem, 463 U.S. at 291.
228. Michigan does not have a death penalty. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2716,
2718 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 2718 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 299).
230. Id.; Solem, 463 U.S. at 291-92.
231. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2718 (1991) (white, J., dissenting).
232. For possession of ten kilograms or more of cocaine. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-231(2)(d) (Supp.
1991).
233. Harnielin, 111 S. Ct. at 2718 (White, J., dissenting). See also ALA. CODE § 13A-12-231(2)(b)
(Supp. 1991). If Harmelin was convicted of the same crime in W. Va., his sentence would be not
less than ninety days nor more than six months. W. VA. CODE § 60A-4-401(c) (1989).
234. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2718 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
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cruel and unusual. ' ' 235 After reviewing the analysis of the three Solem factors above, Justice White states there is "no doubt" that
Harmelin's sentence violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment.
2. Analysis
Justice White's dissent first focuses on a critical analysis of Justice
Scalia's argument that the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee outside context of capital punishment. Justice
White points out that Justice Scalia's contention lacks strong support
and disregards eighty years of Supreme Court case law.
Next, Justice White criticizes Justice Kennedy's decision not to
apply the three Solem factors to Harmelin's sentence. Justice White
argues that Justice Kennedy's two-step test "eviscerates" So/em. 236
He contends that the intra- and inter-jurisdictional analyses have
long been part of Eighth. Amendment jurisprudence and should not
be ignored. 2 7 However, as Justice Kennedy correctly pointed out,

Justice White totally ignores RummeP8 and Davis23 9 which, other
than Solem, are the Supreme Court's most recent analyses of the
Eighth Amendment's proportionality principle.
Justice White's claim that Harmelin's crime was not exceptionally
serious suffers from the same criticism as Harmelin's claim that his
crime was victimless. The deleterious societal effects of cocaine are
fully documented and well substantiated. 240
Justice White's claim that Harmelin was treated the same or more
severely than criminals who have committed more serious crimes is
an extremely subjective judgment. Reasonable people could disagree
with Justice White's contention that armed robbery is a more serious
crime than distribution of between 32,500 and 65,000 street doses
of cocaine. "A professional seller of addictive drugs may inflict
235. Id. at 2719 (quoting Standford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 371 (1989)).
236. Id. at 2714.
237. Id.

238. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
239. See supra text accompanying note 42-45.
240. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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greater bodily harm upon members of society than the person who
commits a single assault. ' 241 Indeed, our federal government of
elected officials have declared that "the illicit narcotics epidemic
currently afflicting the United States represents a direct threat to
the well-being of every United States citizen.' '242
Finally, Justice White argues that because Harmelin's sentence
is by far the most severe in the country, it must fail constitutional
scrutiny. However, as noted in Rummel, a case ignored by Justice
White, the fact that a state has the most severe punishment for a
certain crime does not automatically render that punishment grossly
disproportionate and unconstitutional. 243
Justice White's position certainly has great emotional appeal. No
one can deny the harshness of Harmelin's life sentence with no parole. A rational argument can easily be made that such a sentence
is cruel. However, Harmelin's sentence can hardly be considered
both cruel and unusual when considered in the context of over 200
years of criminal punishment under our Constitution. Also, one must
balance the severity of Harmelin's sentence with the severe effects
of the illegal cocaine trade in which Harmelin was actively engaged: 244 murder, robbery, and newborn addicts just to name a few.
In summary, Justice White's dissent focuses on the most recent
Supreme Court case 245 on cruel and unusual punishment to the exclusion of other relevant cases. RummeP46 and Davis247 were never
overruled by the Supreme Court and are as much a part of the law
as Solem. Thus, the major weakness of Justice White's dissent is

241. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 296 n.12 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
242. 22 U.S.C. § 262p-4a (1988).
243. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 281 (1980).
244. Although Harmelin was not charged and convicted with possession of cocaine with intent
to distribute, the circumstances surrounding Harmelin's crime indicate that he was actively involved
in the illegal distribution of cocaine. The Michigan Legislature has made the inference that anyone
caught with more than 650 grams of cocaine is involved in distribution of the drug as evidenced by
the fact that statutory mandated sentence is the same for both crimes (possession and possession with
intent to distribute of more than 650 grams of cocaine).
245. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
246. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
247. 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
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that it analyzes the issues inside the vacuum of one case, Solem v.
Helm, while ignoring other relevant case law.
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The decision by the Unites States Supreme Court in Harmelin
v. Michigan represents a noteworthy addition to Supreme Court's
jurisprudence concerning the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Most importantly, it represents a narrowing of the Eighth Amendment's proportionality principle, recently
defined in Solem v. Helm. 248 This decision will result in a reduction
of the number of cases in which a full three-factor Solem proportionality analysis will be performed to determine the constitutionality
of a harsh sentence.
Harmelin represents an understanding that the wisdom of the
drug war is an issue for the legislature, not the courts. The question
in this case is what is the law as defined by our Constitution, not
whether or not the government should fight the drug war using tough
tactics. The Supreme Court, noting our federal system of government under the Constitution 2A and recognizing that state legislatures
are better situated to deal with the illegal drug problem, 25 ° has indicated that it will grant substantial deference to state governments
in determining how to implement the war on drugs at the state level.
Despite Justice Scalia's lead opinion to the contrary, a wide majority of the Supreme Court interpret the Eighth Amendment to
contain a proportionality principle. The net result of the splintered
decision in Harmelin is that judicial inquiry into the Eighth Amendment constitutionality of a legislatively mandated sentence will proceed only upon an initial finding of gross disproportionalitybetween
the sentence and the crime. Upon such a finding, the Solem intraand inter-jurisdictional analyses will be performed to determine the
constitutionality of a given sentence.

248. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).

249. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2699 (1991) (plurality opinion); Id. at 2704 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 2699 (plurality opinion); Id. at 2708-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion goes far in reconciling the
seemingly conflicting prior Supreme Court case law on the subject
of cruel and unusual punishments. He analyzes the prior cases and
determines the controlling principle common to all of these cases:
the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. He incorporates the Rummel holding that
'[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges
to the proportionality of particular sentences [are] exceedingly
rare," '' 25 1 and maintains the Solem three-factor analysis upon an initial finding of gross disproportionality between the sentence and
crime.
Also noteworthy is the majority ruling that outside context of
capital punishment, there is no requirement for individualized sentencing schemes where the sentencer must consider factors in mitigation and aggravation and then choose from a range of available
penalties. This holding continues the Supreme Court's tradition of
granting deference to state legislatures in structuring their criminal
justice systems .252

VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Harmelin v. Michigan is significant for two reasons. First, it represents a narrowing of the Eighth
Amendment proportionality principle in relation to Solem decision.
The new standard involves not a test for proportionality, but a test
for gross disproportionality. Second, the Supreme Court has reiterated that state legislatures have wide latitude to define the criminal
penalties applied within their borders. Harmelin represents a signal
to state legislatures that severe criminal penalties remain constitutional weapons in the war on drugs. Finally, the Supreme Court has
added another important chapter to the elusive concept of cruel and
unusual punishment.
Neil S. Whiteman

251. Id. at 2705 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980))).
252. Id. at 2709.
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